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Turkey has historically been ofgreat geopolitical importance tostates in the regions surroundingit as well as to states more
remotely located.  As a member of NATO
during the Cold War it was a geopolitical
asset to the Western bloc as a strong ally in
close proximity to the Soviet Union. With
the fall of the Warsaw Pact, this consider-
ation disappeared. However, Turkey has
regained its geopolitical importance for
other reasons. One of these is its location
between large energy markets and major
energy producers. Though it lacks its own
significant mineral reserves,1 it has strate-
gic advantages for energy transit as it lies
between the Middle East, Russia and the
Caucasus and the large energy markets of
Europe and the West.
Many believe that having control over
energy-transport corridors could be almost
as essential as having control over energy
supplies themselves.2  With its geostrategic
position between important energy suppli-
ers and consumers, Turkey can create a
powerful role for itself in the global energy
market. Turkey and other global actors
have been working towards strengthening
the country’s role as an energy hub,
aggregator and transit corridor in its
region.3  The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)
pipeline carrying oil from the Caspian to
the Mediterranean opened in July 2006,4
and many other projects, including the
Nabucco pipeline, which would supply
Caspian gas to the EU, bypassing Russia,5
are under serious consideration. Through
such initiatives, Turkey can not only gain
energy security for itself, but also contrib-




Until recently there has been no
significant common policy regarding the
security of energy and energy imports in
the European Union. Over the last several
years, many in the EU have started to
become aware of the security dangers of
such a policy gap. A Green Paper pub-
lished in November 2000 by the European
Commission pointed out the shortcomings
of the EU’s behavior and initiated a serious
debate on the need for a “secure” supply
of energy.6  A more recent Green Paper
goes further, proposing that all member
states agree on a strategic objective in
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terms of energy that would satisfy “…the
need for the EU as a whole to have an
energy mix that, overall, meets its core
energy objectives.”7
According to the recent Paper, the EU’s
dependence on external energy has been
increasing constantly.8  As the world’s largest
energy consumer without its own significant
energy reserves, the Union is today one of
the world’s fastest-growing energy markets
and the biggest energy importer.9   The 25
EU member states depend for about 80
percent of their energy consumption on fossil
fuels (oil, natural gas and coal). About 50
percent of their oil and natural gas require-
ments are imported, and experts predict that
this number will rise to 70 percent by 2030.10
Imports of natural gas will rise to 80 percent
over the coming 25 years.11
These import figures clearly demon-
strate that energy resources inside the EU
are limited. According to the European
Commission, extraction costs in the Union
are high and the scarce domestic sources
that the EU has are running out.12  Domes-
tic oil resources, for example, are moving
towards exhaustion;13  renewables, which
could become a significant domestic
resource of energy in the EU, will need
significant investments and substantial
policy efforts in order to do so.14  There-
fore, the EU as a whole cannot expect
domestic energy production to contribute
to fulfilling its energy needs under the
current circumstances.
This situation makes the EU vulner-
able, particularly due to its economic
dependence on certain types of energy,
such as oil and gas, and on particular
exporting countries.15  Currently, the Union
imports 40 percent of its external natural
gas from Russia and 45 percent of its
imported oil from the OPEC Middle East
countries.16  The European Commission
states that the security of supply should not
be realized maximizing energy self-
sufficiency or reducing EU dependence.
The policy towards security of supply
should rather aim at minimizing the risks
associated with EU energy dependence
“by balancing between and diversifying
various sources of supply (by product and
by geographical region).”17
In terms of diversifying its energy
sources, the Union’s options are rather
limited due to the lack of feasible alternative
sources. The policy of diversifying energy
imports can also bring only limited results.
The world’s remaining oil reserves will be
increasingly concentrated in the Middle
East;18  major natural gas reserves are
located in only a few regions from which the
production and transport costs are economi-
cally viable for the Union: Russia, the
Caspian region, the Near East and Nigeria.19
Since Turkey borders most of these regions
on one side and the EU on the other, it could
provide for greater energy security by
becoming another vital import route into the
Union.
According to Roberts, 10 producers, with
35.5 percent of global gas reserves, are or
might potentially be interested in using
Turkey as a transit country to the EU. Thus
the country’s role in the Union’s gas import
market will remain great. Although Turkey
plays a role in the global oil market as well,
its role as a transit country for the EU
market is important rather than vital.20
According to these conclusions, Turkey is of
major geopolitical importance to the EU.21
It can be vital in the relations between the
EU and many of its energy suppliers and
could constitute an option towards greater
diversification of export routes to the Union
and therefore more energy security.
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 The United States
Like the EU, the United States faces
energy security risks. It recognizes that its
growing dependence on imported energy is
a security threat and that a policy to reduce
this threat is necessary.22  According to the
Energy Policy Development Group,
“America in the year 2001 face[d] the
most serious energy shortage since the oil
embargoes of the 1970s.”23  The Group
projects that over the next 20 years, U.S.
oil consumption will increase by 33 percent
and its consumption of natural gas will
increase 50 percent. Although the use of oil
has fallen by about 20 percent since 1970s,
oil today is the largest source of primary
energy in the United States, accounting for
about 40 percent of American energy
needs.24  The United States has been a net
importer of oil since the 1950s, and today
oil accounts for 89 percent of net U.S.
energy imports.25
Unlike the EU, the United States has
substantial domestic energy resources.
America is the world’s second-largest
natural-gas producer and its third-largest oil
producer. However, it imports more than
half of the oil it consumes.26  These
numbers demonstrate that the United
States, although a large energy producer
itself, faces problems because of its
dependence on foreign producers and the
narrow range of energy options. The long-
term solution to these problems in the
United States, as in the EU, is more
supplier diversification, “not only for energy
security but also for national security.”27
Although the United States is the
second-largest importer of energy,28  it
seems to be facing a lesser threat in terms
of import dependency than the EU. First, it
was importing only 24 percent of its energy
resources in 2002,29  a much lower share
than the EU’s 50 percent. Second, the four
largest suppliers of oil to the United States
are Canada, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and
Mexico, which together account for 55
percent of U.S. gross imports. Due to
geographic proximity, free-trade agree-
ments, integrated pipeline networks or
reciprocal energy-sector investments,30 the
United States has good diplomatic and
economic relations with at least three of
them and therefore faces a lesser threat.
Despite this fact, the threat exists, and the
United States is unlikely to be able to
mitigate it by domestic policies. The
recommendation of the National Energy
Policy Development Group was to “build
strong relationships with energy-producing
nations” and “to restore America’s credibil-
ity overseas.”31  It is therefore necessary
that energy security and, consequently,
supplier diversification become priorities of
U.S. trade and foreign policy.32  Turkey
can in some ways be instrumental in these
efforts.
The U.S. administration has highlighted
the role of Turkey as an energy hub and
especially as a crucial link between
Caspian and Central Asian energy reserves
and world markets. In its efforts to pro-
mote Turkey’s role, Washington empha-
sizes its own importance in supporting the
cooperation of Turkey and the EU in
energy security matters.33  On the other
hand, the United States promotes Turkey’s
reliability as a dependable conduit for
landlocked Caspian energy resources for
itself.  Turkey can help the United States
attain its goal of resource diversification.34
Unlike the EU, the United States has
pursued a coherent and unified foreign
energy policy for many decades. Through-
out the Cold War, the United States
supplied military training and arms and
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established military bases in oil-rich regions in
the Persian Gulf and Africa,35 as well as in
Turkey.  After the collapse of the Soviet
Union, the United States has seen no reason
to pursue such policies further; the main
competitor has disappeared. However, as
threats posed by newly emerging powers
such as China and Russia grew throughout
the 1990s, the United States returned to such
policies and is now extending its military aid
to states in the Caspian Basin as well.36
Simultaneously, Washington has also begun to
promote greater economic and political
cooperation with Turkey.37
After the end of the Cold War, the
United States tried to establish military
connections with the newly independent
states in the region so that U.S. firms could
comfortably invest there. America also
strongly promoted its ideas as to where new
infrastructure should be built. Because this
was a matter of national security,38  U.S.
leaders at the highest levels have been
personally involved in negotiations with local
powers. An instance of such behavior
occurred when President Clinton oversaw
the signing of an agreement for the BTC
pipeline in 1999, a pipeline now transporting
oil from Baku, Azerbaijan, to the Turkish port
Ceyhan, from which oil can be shipped to
Western markets. On the military side, some
see the war in Afganistan and the ongoing
deployment of U.S. military forces in
Kyrgystan and Uzbekistan and American
military advisors in Georgia for the protection
of infrastructure and related matters as a
way for the United States to gain military
control over the Caspian and the Caucasus
before others can. Military control and aid
are, of course, major tools for promoting
American interests in the region.39  All these
efforts to increase United States energy
security depend on the cooperation of
Turkey, apparently the most secure and
preferred transit route from this region, when
compared to Iran or Russia. From the energy
angle, Turkey is therefore of substantial
geopolitical importance to the United States,




Turkey is geopolitically important to
energy producers as well. The energy-
market instability that could be created by the
concentration of global production in a few
regions benefits neither consumers nor
producers.40 Due to the small number of
major producers, any deliberate policy efforts
or instability in producing regions are likely to
increase price volatility, which has adverse
impacts on both consumers and producers.
Since Turkey has the potential as a transit
country to increase the geographic diversifi-
cation of energy resources to the West, it is
important in helping to contain price volatili-
ties.
The Caspian Basin
The Caspian Basin consists of parts of
Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran,41
Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan.42  With the
exception of Iran, this region was under full
control of the former USSR until 1989.
Although Moscow knew that there were
significant reserves in this region, it decided
to redirect its oil investments elsewhere in the
mid-1970s.43  Under the Soviet Union, the
Caspian was therefore a region with under-
developed infrastructure and export routes;
the only export routes went though Russia,
though with insufficient capacity.
After gaining independence, some
countries in the region found it undesirable to
let Russia have full power over their exports
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and, therefore, prices. Because Turkey
borders this region, it automatically became
an alternative to Russia. The Russian
monopoly has been undermined by the BTC
oil pipeline that became operational in 2006
and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (Shah Deniz)
gas pipeline currently under construction.
Both of these pipelines connect the Caspian
with Turkey. Although some of the Caspian
countries have the possibility of exporting to
the East and circumventing Russia, Turkey
represents a possible important route to the
large Western markets. Therefore, Turkey is
of great geopolitical importance to the
Caspian region.
Some of these countries should be able
to gain greater profits from their resources
and also strengthen their sovereignty and
stability.44  In their efforts to diversify their
energy resources, which include promoting
the Turkish route from the Caspian, both
the EU and the United States have been
investing in the region. Some investments
aim at developing the region’s energy
resources alone, while others — coming
especially from the EU — have aimed at
providing aid and supporting economic,
social and political development.
The West also has security interests in
the Caspian. The EU and the United States
are interested in the resolution of local
“frozen” conflicts, which lead to instability
in the region as a whole as well as to
activities such as trafficking, corruption45
or the possibility of manipulation of devel-
opments in the region by other great
powers. Various authors point out, for
example, that Russia has some involvement
in the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and
South Ossetia and can rekindle them,
causing difficulties for the continuing
development of energy infrastructure in the
region.46  Believing in the importance of
military strength, the United States contin-
ues to promote its own goals, and Western
goals in general, by military rivalry in the
Caspian with other powers, such as China
or Iran. Therefore, due to its resource
wealth and the battle over the location of
export routes, the region has also become a
scene of the “Great Game” waged be-
tween major world powers over energy
resources.  This could have negative
consequences, instability being the most
likely.
Russia
Another major energy producer
bordering on Turkey is Russia. As its
largest export and the most significant
source of foreign exchange, energy plays a
major role in the Russian political economy.
Russia is the third-largest producer of oil in
the world and one of the world’s largest
natural-gas producers. Russia is self-
sufficient in terms of energy, which is
important for the country’s future possibili-
ties for growth and development. However,
its great energy wealth and the legacy of
Soviet central planning have also led
Russia to become one of the most energy-
inefficient countries in the world,47  needing
as much as 8.5 units of energy consumed
to produce 1 unit of GDP.  For the same
purposes, the EU needs only 1 unit of
energy, and China 6.5 units.48
Nevertheless, Russia still manages to
produce surplus energy resources, export-
ing 30 percent of its energy production.49
Over the last several years, the Russian
economy has grown impressively, a growth
fueled primarily by revenues from energy
exports. The revenues from the Russian oil
and gas sectors are estimated to have
accounted for 25 percent of Russia’s GDP
in 2003.50  However, its heavy dependence
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on energy exports causes its economy to
be vulnerable to even minor fluctuations in
world energy prices. The great importance
of energy also causes the state to attempt
to influence the energy sector. Moscow
has been preventing the liberalization of the
Russian energy market and has national-
ized parts of the energy sector, creating
monopolies in natural gas and electricity.51
Compared to Russia, Turkey stands in
an entirely different relationship to the
Caspian. Because of its geographical
position, Russia could potentially export
energy to the Western markets (including
Israel) through Turkey.  However, unlike
the Caspian, Russia borders the EU, has
access to international ports and is an
established and significant exporter to the
West. Russia also possesses infrastructure
to bring energy resources from the Caspian
into Russia. Turkey is, therefore, more
likely to compete with Russia for the transit
of Caspian exports than to become its
energy transit route. Adding to Turkey’s
disadvantage is the fact that it is largely
dependent on Russia for its own natural-
gas imports. It took more than half its gas
imports from Russia in 2004.52
Turkey and Russia have been historic
rivals. The Ottoman and Russian empires
competed for regional supremacy; later,
Turkey was the front-line NATO state in
the Cold War against the Soviet Union.
Although trade and diplomatic and political
relations between the two have improved
greatly since the end of the Cold War, the
rivalry continues, particularly in relation to
energy, as the two countries struggle over
pipeline routes and influence in neighboring
regions, including the Caspian Basin.53
Although involved on different sides of
regional conflicts in the Caspian, both
Russia and Turkey claim to be willing to
continue the peace process in this region.54
Both sides are also putting effort into
expanding bilateral energy trade.55  The
Blue Stream pipeline bringing gas from
Russia to Turkey is an example.
Although Turkey displays goodwill and
tries to avoid taking sides in any “Russia
vs. the West” struggle,56 rivalries over
energy pipelines continue. How far Russia
can go in its efforts to monopolize the
European market and monopsonize
Caspian exports depends largely on energy
consumers. Some experts suggest that
Gazprom, Russia’s dominant energy
company, would be able to stifle any
competition and fulfill the needs of the
Balkans and large parts of the European
energy market, thereby shutting Turkey out
of many gas-transit possibilities. Although
Gazprom has taken some major steps in
the direction of preventing third countries
from having access to the European gas
market without Russian control,57 it is
unlikely to shut off its competition entirely58
for political and financial reasons.
A Gazprom monopoly in the European
market is directly in conflict with the
Western policy of diversification. The
dangers of the power of this monopoly
have come to the attention of the West,
particularly the EU, in recent months, when
Russia cut off natural-gas supplies to
Ukraine, which wholly depends on Russia
and is also a transport country to the EU.
Therefore, the EU has a major interest in
reducing the power of Gazprom in its
market. In its Green Paper, the European
Commission points out that the Union
“should keep a watchful eye”59 on the
development and direction of export routes
from the Caspian.
The United States supports the EU’s
interests in natural gas and promotes the
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Source: A. Necdet Pamir, “Turkey’s Energy Policies between East and West,” presentation on
February 21, 2006, Bilkent University, http://www.bilkent.edu.tr/~crs/necdetpamir.ppt.
interests of all Western consumers with
relation to oil. As discussed above, Wash-
ington sees the diversification of energy-
supplying and transit regions as a matter of
national security. The United States
therefore strongly supports the develop-
ment of a Turkish transit route from the
Caspian as an alternative or an addition to
the Russian route.60
Western consumers support Turkey as
an alternative route from the Caspian to
create competition to Gazprom and Russia
overall;61  some Caspian producers also
perceive Turkey as a better transit country
for their exports. This fuels the rivalry
between Russia and Turkey in the energy
field and forces Russia to take into consid-
eration the importance of Turkey in the
geopolitics of the region.
Middle East
For the energy-rich Middle East region,
Turkey can be geopolitically significant as a
possible energy export transit route to the
West.  However, most of the Middle East
has well-established infrastructure. The
countries of the Middle East posses 61.7
percent of the world’s recoverable oil
reserves and 40.6 percent of recoverable
natural-gas reserves,62  by far the largest
of any region in the world.
The largest exporters in the Middle
East are the countries around the Persian
Gulf. As of 2003, Saudi Arabia was the
largest energy exporter, accounting for
almost 50 percent of overall Persian Gulf
exports. Iran exports 15 percent, and the
UAE 14 percent, of overall Persian Gulf
exports. Iraq makes up 5 percent of these
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Figure 2
Source: A. Necdet Pamir, “Turkey’s Energy Policies between East and West,” presentation on
February 21, 2006, Bilkent University, http://www.bilkent.edu.tr/~crs/necdetpamir.ppt.
exports (Figure 1). Most of these oil
exports leave the Persian Gulf through the
Strait of Hormuz; only a very small portion
through Turkey (Figure 2). The United
States buys a little over 20 percent of its
overall oil from the Persian Gulf.63  The
EU buys 45 percent of its imported oil from
Middle East OPEC countries.64  The main
natural-gas suppliers to both of these
Western markets lie outside of the Middle
East; however, countries like Iran or Iraq
may become important suppliers of gas to
the EU.65
It is therefore obvious that very little
energy exported from the Middle East
reaches the West through Turkey. There
are currently several projects in place
exporting oil and gas from Iran (the Tabriz-
Erzurum pipeline) and Iraq to Turkey.
However, due to problems on the supply
side, including political and technical
impediments and sabotage66 these projects
cannot carry significant amounts of energy.
The situation in these two energy-exporting
Gulf countries continues to fluctuate.
Some of the countries in the Middle
East (Iran, Egypt, Syria and even Iraq)
consider using Turkey as an important
transit country to the West. Other major
producers, such as Qatar, UAE and Oman,
however, remain quite hesitant and have
access to other export routes. According to
Roberts, these large exporters will decide
on using Turkey depending on security
developments in Iraq and other parts of the
Middle East, the success of the Iranian and
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other pipelines, and the future importance
of Turkey as a transit route.67  Therefore,
although Turkey is a natural energy bridge
between the Middle East and Western
markets, especially the EU, the geopolitical
importance of the country to Middle
Eastern producers is not yet certain.
CONCLUSION
Historically, Turkey has been of
significant geopolitical importance to the
regions surrounding it as well as to regions
and countries further away.68  This contin-
ues today; the country continues to be of
geopolitical significance to many. This
importance stems predominantly from its
location between large energy markets and
major energy producers. With energy
demand growing and resources diminishing,
large energy consumers like the EU or the
United States seek to secure supplies,
largely by diversifying their energy suppli-
ers. If Turkey became a major energy
transit corridor into the EU, the Union
would be able to increase the diversifica-
tion of its energy suppliers and transit
countries to a rather significant extent.
Therefore, Turkey is of major geopolitical
importance to the EU in terms of energy.
An energy transit corridor through Turkey
would enable more diversification to the
United States as well. Hence, from the
energy angle, Turkey is also of substantial
geopolitical importance to the United
States, although perhaps not of as great
importance as it is to the EU.
On the producer side, Turkey is also
quite important. Some countries in the
landlocked Caspian perceive Turkey as the
only export route in their effort to avoid
exporting through Russia or Iran. The
involvement of Western powers seeking
diversification in the Caspian by promoting
pipelines through Turkey brings both
positives — such as economic aid and
military assistance — and negatives —
such as more instability as a ground for the
Great Game.
Turkey is of somewhat lesser impor-
tance to the other two exporting regions
discussed. Energy pipeline routes and
struggles over influence in energy-produc-
ing regions fuel rivalry between Russia and
Turkey and force Russia to take Turkey’s
importance into consideration in the
geopolitics of the region. Turkey’s signifi-
cance to the Middle Eastern countries from
the energy angle is yet to be determined.
Although it is a natural energy bridge
between the Middle East and Western
markets — especially the EU — its
geopolitical importance to the Middle East
will be ascertained later, based on security
developments in Iraq and other parts of the
Middle East, the success of the Iranian and
other pipelines, and the future importance
of Turkey as a transit route.
Geostrategic opportunities as well as
hurdles surround Turkey. There have been
solid achievements in realizing the East-
West energy corridor through Turkey with
the strong encouragement of the United
States and, to a lesser extent, the EU.  At
the same time, the Great Game rivalries in
the Middle East and Caspian have been
limiting Turkey’s potential as a major transit
route. Despite these constraints, the
country has the potential to make a signifi-
cant contribution to the security of energy
supplies regionally and globally.
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